Strategy presents a dramatically new way of thinking about the conduct of war and the diplomacy of peace. Luttwak calls it "paradoxical logic" and illustrates its peculiar workings with vivid examples drawn from past and present. Although paradox is often recognized in prosaic and one-sided form ("Attack is the best defense" or "If you want peace, prepare war"), the dynamic structure of strategy has never before been examined in full dimension and step by step.

Assembling myriad historical examples—why Churchill rejected the apparently logical plan for the all-out bombing of Germany; why the French found it imperative to defend hopeless positions in Indochina; why the Egyptians could resist Israeli tanks and aircraft but not the temptation to attack—and ranging from the Pearl Harbor bombing in 1941 to yesterday's skirmish in the Middle East, Luttwak shows us particular strategic concepts in action, in order to reveal how straightforward, commonsense logic fails in conflictual situations. He applies his expert knowledge of military science, military history, and international politics to each level of strategy: technical, tactical, and finally the highest level of grand strategy, where political and military actions converge. The unavoidable, if difficult, conclusion is that strategists must cultivate a new mental habit, the deliberate use of paradoxical thinking. Only by understanding the contradictory nature of strategy can we hope to avoid blundering into war.

Within the large literature on military strategy, we find no general theory supported by a cogent accumulation of insight and research. Luttwak's remarkable book fills that gap: there is no comparable modern work. It will be of interest to political scientists, military historians and theorists, defense experts, and all readers who contemplate the exigencies of war and peace.