The central idea of this book I have borrowed from Clausewitz who, as a seventeenth-century writer said of Machiavelli, "hath been too often taxed for his impieties." It is a simple idea, and the novice would justly imagine it to be a commonplace—that the question of why we fight must dominate any consideration of means. Yet this absurdly simple theme has been mostly ignored, and when not ignored usually denied.

Though I had long thought of writing this book, it required the special agonies of Vietnam to bring a sense of urgency to the matter. To attempt to put war in its political context is to observe inevitably that war is characterized by men killing on a grand scale for reasons that are usually foolish and often wicked; and Vietnam, besides being current, presents more than its share of both foolishness and wickedness.

The word politics in the title of this book is used in the broadest possible sense; on the whole it more often refers to the international than to the domestic variety. I may here perhaps also reassure the reader that the difference between the two parts of the book is more a matter of structure than of essence. The first part reads rather like a historical resume of four wars, but it has in it more generalization than a historian would own to. Conversely, in the second part there is a good deal of history along with the theory, and in any case my purpose is exactly the same in both parts.

An earlier version of Chapter 7, "Some Theories on the Causes of War," appeared in the two-volume Festschrift published in Paris in 1971 in honor of a friend and a great contemporary contributor to insight on matters of war and peace—Science et conscience de la société; mélanges en l'honneur de Raymond Aron (Calmann-Lévy). I have, however, entirely rewritten it and greatly expanded it for this book. The rest is almost entirely new.

Most of the persons whose assistance I most gratefully acknowledge here read only a small portion of the manuscript, usually because I desired to tap some special knowledge that each of them represents. First I must thank Professor Michael Howard of All Souls College, Oxford, who was especially helpful with the first chapter. The following colleagues of my own political science department at the University of California, Los Angeles, were helpful mostly in giving their responses to the two chapters on Vietnam: Professors Hans H. Baerwald, Irving Bernstein, William P. Gerberding, Simon Serfaty, Richard Sklar, and David O. Wilkinson. Those of the history department at UCLA who gave valuable assistance, especially with respect to Chapter 6, "Changing Attitudes Toward War," were Professors Jere King, Andrew Lossky, and Arthur J. Slavin. Another member of the latter department is my wife, Fawn M. Brodie, who, as always, assisted in a multitude of ways. I must also mention Konrad Kellen of the RAND Corporation, whose special gifts of insight I tapped for the Vietnam chapters.

I am happy to mention my indebtedness to Mrs. Arvella Powell, who typed and retyped the entire manuscript, and to the Ford Foundation, which allocated to me a most useful grant that was benignly administered by Professor David A. Wilson and Mrs. Clare Walker.

Finally, I would like to pay my grateful respects to the memory of my greatest teacher, Jacob Viner, who at the time I was his student in graduate school over thirty years ago was Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. Whatever is good in my work owes something to him, and I was especially conscious of his eye over my shoulder in writing Chapter 7. I also offer my respects to another dedicated and scholarly teacher of whom I was very fond, Quincy Wright, formerly Professor of International Law and Political Science at the University of Chicago. Both were friends and colleagues as well as former teachers, and both died not long ago.

B. B.