Two decades ago, it was unquestioned: the Soviets were clearly well behind the U.S. in terms of military capability. Determined to overcome that inferiority, they have been steadily increasing their hardware inventories, building the capability of their weaponry, and adding to the numbers of their forces. In recent years, the American people have begun to perceive the trends—and they recognize that those trends are unfavorable. The Soviets have caught up. No informed citizen—defense professional or layman—can blind himself to the fact that we are no longer second to none.

For several years, John Collins, working as an analyst of national security and defense issues for the Congressional Research Service, has built a respected reputation among those familiar with issues of defense and national security. Based largely on the high regard in which Mr. Collins is held professionally, two years ago we jointly requested that he undertake a comprehensive treatment of the military and strategic balance between our nation's forces and those of the Soviet Union.

The final product of John Collins' work, as published between these covers, is a balance sheet. The book is a milestone, as well as the first truly comprehensive look at the subject, in which the author not only examines all facets of the situation but attempts to relate those elements to one another.

If John Collins' extensive treatment of the U.S.–Soviet military balance can be said to produce a single conclusion, it would be this: that the national security problems of the United States as we enter the 1980s stem not so much from Soviet actions and accomplishments as they do from policy decisions made in Washington, D.C. The U.S., over the last 20 years, has gradually stripped its Armed Services' capabilities to the point of inflexibility. It is not Collins' intent to point fingers of blame at those responsible for bringing us to our present state. Indeed, his efforts emphasize the realization that our current situation is the product of bipartisan actions—and inactions—by individuals and coalitions throughout the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal government.

Although our original objective in requesting the preparation of this extensive and ambitious study was to provide unbiased, valid, and objective data to assist in the annual Congressional deliberations of defense expenditures (we both serve on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives), the final product has an appeal and usefulness of far broader dimension. Despite its fairly technical theme and manner of presentation, U.S.–Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960–1980 constitutes worthwhile reading for every American who is concerned, for whatever purpose, with the defense posture of this nation. It is safe to say that there is something in Collins' work for everyone. Whether the reader is liberal in his political perceptions and convictions, conservative, or without a pre-ordained opinion, he will find within these pages evidence to support his particular point of view. He may, as well, see his most treasured biases laid bare and pitted against strongly structured opposing perspectives. Both the informed layman and the defense professional can acquire a realistic grasp of the problems we face—and the options available to solve those problems.

U.S.–Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-1980 accomplishes many goals: it examines issues, offers options, and tries—above all—to provide thought. The work is as significant for what it does not do. For example, Collins is sparing of flat statements, nor does he propose any set answers to our defense dilemma or explain how we should go about resolving our difficulties. In summing up his work, he does not terminate, as might be expected, with a series of tidily constructed conclusions, or a recipe book of recommendations. In fact, in the "tailpiece" section, he specifically states the opposite: that there are no verifiable conclusions, but only opinions and judgements. However, in the face of overwhelming evidence, he shows no timidity in expressing a clearcut position on a given aspect of military planning or preparedness.

As a cautionary note, the author repeatedly warns the reader not to focus on the separate pieces of the puzzle, but to concentrate on fitting them together as part of a central theme or unifying strategy. For Collins, that theme is that a nation without a cohesive and coherent defense policy cannot operate with optimum effectiveness in world affairs. As a parallel, in everyday life, the American public is bombarded by single issues, presented in isolation, as the media go about the daily chore of filling their news broadcasts and papers with bits and pieces, rarely taking the time to present a comprehensive picture. Unfortunately, the defense decisionmaking process in this country is too often carried out in a similar fragmented fashion. Just as the reader who takes part of the Collins analysis out of its proper context will undoubtedly reach distorted or even outright erroneous conclusions, our current security situation is glaringly evident of the lack of comprehensive planning and consideration that went into its design and implementation.

In pursuing his theme, Collins has characterized the 1970s as a period of disunity, a period during which the U.S. was devoid of a unifying concept or coherent military strategy. This disunity stemmed from the point some years earlier when the U.S. ceased to have a viable policy, the point in the 1960s when we entered the Vietnam conflict with our own forces. It was then that our consensus on U.S. foreign and defense policy began to disintegrate, and it has never recoalesced. As Cyrus Vance, speaking shortly after resigning as Secretary of State, put it, "We must have in our minds a conception of the world we want a decade hence. The 1990 we seek must shape our actions in 1980, or the decisions of 1980 could give us a 1990 we will regret." He went on to point out that we have no overarching conceptual framework to guide us in investing our defense dollars and fitting our forces into an effective strategy.

The reasons and explanations as to why we have arrived at our current dilemma are part of the fabric of Collins' analysis. One consideration is the nature of how major positions in our defense policy-making structure are filled. Our itinerant defense officials come and go with such frequency that they have no more than a transient stake in the results of their actions, no consequential responsibility associated with their tenure. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara didn't have to live with the TFX decision, nor did former Chief of Naval Operations Zumwalt have to face the consequences of his "sea control ship." Contrast our system with that of the Soviets, in which Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov has been at the helm of their Navy for more than 20 years.

Collins has capsulized the basic U.S. problems in the tailpiece of his book, the section entitled "Meaningful Manifestations." In those two pages, he presents an outline of the comprehensive picture, as documented in the other 592 pages of text and tables.

In this imposing volume, Collins stresses the crucial interrelationship between defense concepts and capabilities. A common fallacy in comparing force levels is to attempt an equation based only on dollar amounts or percentage of respective Gross National Products. Collins avoids the inevitable distortions that arise from these methods by expressing defense expenditure, weapon inventories, and associated force levels in terms of how the resulting military capabilities relate to the strategic concepts they support. He makes a convincing case that a nation can devote substantial increases in funds to build the size and capability of its forces and still enjoy no real improvement unless it is working in line with a unifying concept, an all-encompassing idea or strategy.

Another disquieting revelation from Collins' analysis is that straightline projections of U.S. military trends foretell an insecure future for our nation. Collins uses as one example of this the comparison of more than one hundred items of basic research and applied technology, to show that the U.S. is failing to protect its leads. Our competitors are pushing to extend their advantage in every instance, and the straightline projections will eventually converge as the Soviets overtake the U.S.—surpassing us to the extent that we now outstrip them.

This reflects one of the other recurring themes of Collins' analysis: that we have reached a breakpoint in national security, at which we are either going to change direction and regain our relative strength—or accept a position of inferiority.

The current controversy over the All-Volunteer Force is an excellent case in point. The arguments on either side of the issue, as good as they may be by debating standards, all miss the point. Even if we were to fill our entire military force structure to its authorized level with people possessing the proper qualifications, we would still have only 16 active Army Divisions, 12 attack carrier forces, and 26 tactical fighter wings—plus the requirement to maintain a huge rotation base for all those forces. The real point, however, is that even with our military manpower commitments fully met, we could not presently meet the commitments that have been determined as vital to our security interests overseas.

The manpower problem was vividly highlighted when President Carter tacitly asked the Congress not to appropriate money for additional ships and planes in the FY 1980 budget. Not enough people realize that we do not have sufficient qualified manpower in our Armed Forces to maintain and operate the ships and planes we already have; moreover, even if our military services were manned at 100 percent, we would lack adequate weaponry to arm them. In short, we simply do not have the overall force structure—even in design—to adequately meet our worldwide commitments.

A few notes on the methods Collins has used in preparing this work will help the reader appreciate the validity and quality of his finished product. To minimize the inevitable bias that results in any one-author effort, he has called upon every corner of the defense community for comments and criticism. He made a special attempt to gather a full range of opinions, searching the spectrum from the "Far Left" to the "Ultraconservative Right." When his manuscript was in draft stage, he solicited reviews from a variety of commentators, many of whom were deliberately chosen for the effectiveness of their opposing arguments. Not only did this repetitive comment-and-review process serve to bring a broad scope of viewpoints into consideration, it helped to ensure full subject coverage. The final version fulfills the author's aims: an authoritative, comprehensive and balanced presentation, a distillate of defense information, judgements, and opinion.

In compiling the Regional Sections of the book, Collins sought input from literally thousands of foreign sources. Individuals from the German, Japanese, and Korean defense, foreign service, academic, and industrial communities contributed information. Defense experts from Southern Asia, the Near and Middle East, and of course throughout Western Europe, offered their special knowledge and insight. Many of the foreign embassies in Washington provided policy and position papers.

One of the more serious shortcomings in a work of this kind is imposed by the restrictions on classified information; the reader has no way to compensate for the gaps created by the data that cannot be publicly revealed. Virtually every topic in Collins' work involves pertinent information that cannot be published, but which is germane to a full understanding of the particular subject. Collins has used a unique approach to overcome the difficulty. As he states, there are details in the book which differ from corresponding data as found in classified materials. However, the relative strengths and trends he presents convey as accurate and reliable a perception of the facts as would be possible from classified sources. Moreover, as military analysts from the various services have confirmed, nothing in this book is invalidated by the related classified information that is not displayed.

As a final word to this Foreword, we would like to express our satisfaction at the end product of John Collins' effort. Without quesion, the volume holds value for every member of the defense establishment in this nation, everyone who will play a role in determining what our future defense decisions will be, and every American who is concerned about the future security of our country and our way of life.

In asking for Mr. Collins' study, our hope was that his work would be completed "in time to make a difference," and we retain that wish as his efforts are published. Throughout the detailed review and evaluation of various capabilities of U.S. versus Soviet assets, a message emerges. Our failure to understand that message and act appropriately can mean that our nation's lack of a coherent foreign and defense policy and our lack of will to act decisively and positively for our own survival may combine to destroy our security, our economy and our position in the world.

Seeing the study in its final form, we can only hope that the message conveyed by Mr. Collins will not go unheard, and that the many questions his work evokes will not go unanswered.

 

 

Bill Chappel, Jr.
U.S. House of Representatives
D-Florida

Jack F. Kemp
U.S. House of Representatives
R-New York