The security of Western Europe, long regarded as vital to the security of the United States, depends on the U.S. pledge of nuclear deterrent power and a large share of the ground forces that would be available in a full-scale mobilization. Both NATO plans and the U.S. contribution are now being seriously questioned. This book examines the arguments for changing the U.S. commitment of ground forces.

William P. Mako integrates the testimony of defense officials and the views of informed observers in describing the current military equation in central Europe as it applies to conventional warfare. He calculates the balance of forces at various times after mobilization to gauge how confident NATO can feel about its defensive prospects. He then discusses the pros and cons of proposals for altering the defensive posture of the Western side, in the context of the history of the U.S. role in European security since 1940.

Strong arguments have been made for shifting emphasis from rapid to deliberate reinforcement by U.S. forces. Moving some forces by sea would lessen the problems and risks stemming from the current reliance on storing equipment in Europe and airlifting troops from the United States. And concurrent demands of conflicts elsewhere might interfere with the flow of American reinforcements—a possibility that has prompted suggestions for strengthening U.S. and allied reserve forces to meet European requirements. Yet Mako's analysis of these proposals and his review of how the United States has met its commitments to European security in recent decades persuade him that there is no reason for making any substantial change in the present deployment or structure of U.S. ground forces.