This book sets forth new and more useful strategies to fill the conceptual void in the current Administration's efforts to strengthen America's defenses. It argues that today's defense policy is governed by concepts developed during the 1950s and 1960s that are unsuitable for today's more complex world. In the future, security cannot rely on numbers alone: it must be founded on insight, skill, creativity, and the ability to outwit opponents.

The authors are convinced that the United States must put greater reliance on non-nuclear means of deterrence and NATO must adopt a strategy of conventional retaliation against Eastern Europe in the event of war. In light of the Soviet increase in military power during the last fifteen years and the expansion of American interests, particularly in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the current military build-up of more money, more men, and more weapons is not enough.

In evaluating the old strategies, the authors suggest that the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine was never U.S. policy, and they criticize the Pentagon's reliance on systems analysis for making strategic decisions. In addition, they assess the ideas of essential equivalence in nuclear weapons and question American over-reliance on quality rather than quantity in weapons procurement. In presenting their new approaches, they set forth a strategy for competing with the Soviets in the Third World, explore how the United States can deal with and benefit from the realignment of Third World states, develop the case for ballistic missile defenses, and outline a comprehensive strategy for ensuring the security of U.S. energy supplies.