At the outbreak of the Korean War in June I950, the U.S. Army combat units nearest the scene were the four infantry divisions performing occupation duties in Japan. When the Army of the Republic of Korea, supported only by U.S. air and naval forces, was unable to halt the North Korean aggressors, these divisions, seriously understrength and only partially trained and equipped for fighting, provided the troops that were committed initially to action in response to the call of the United Nations Security Council.

Colonel Appleman's narrative portrays vividly the grimness of "limited war" against a fanatical enemy, and the tragic consequences of unpreparedness. His writing recaptures the dismay that most Amerícans experienced in the realization that a small, little-known country could achieve military success against a coalition that included this, the world's most powerful nation.

Here is the story of how U.S. Army combat units, thrown piecemeal into the battle to slow Communist advances, fought a desperate and heroic delaying action, buying time until the United Nations forces could attain the military strength necessary to take the offensive. When that offensíve was launched, it quickly crushed the North Korean forces, only to be met with the massive intervention of a more formidable adversary, Communist China.

This volume covers U.S. Army action in Korea from the outbreak of war to the full-scale intervention of the Chinese Communists. It is the first of five volumes now planned for inclusion in UNITED STATES ARWY IN THE KOREAN WAR, a series patterned on the much more voluminous UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. Subsequent volumes will complete the Korean combat narrative as well as deal with related problems of command, strategy, logistics, handling of prisoners of war, and the armistice negotiations.