BOLGER, Daniel P. : Scenes from an unfinished war (ismertető)
SYNOPSIS OF LEAVENWORTH PAPER 19
From November 1966 until December 1969, American and South Korean forces battled North Korean special operations teams across the length and breadth of the peninsula. The Second Korean Conflict featured small-scale skirmishes along the uneasy Demilitarized Zone, spectacular terrorist strikes, the seizure of the USS Pueblo, and several determined North Korean efforts to foment a viable insurgency. The United States and the Republic of Korea prevailed in this low-intensity conflict.
Why did the United States and its Korean allies win? This Leavenworth Paper offers a case study in how an operational-level commander, General Charles H. Bonesteel III, met the challenge of low-intensity conflict in his theater. Bonesteel and his United States and Korean subordinates crafted a series of shrewd, pragmatic measures that eventually defanged North Korea's aggressive unconventional warfare campaign. This accomplishment is even more remarkable in light of the many circumstances that severely cramped Bonesteel's options. Mediocre, conventionally oriented allied forces, a volatile Korean political scene, half-baked American doctrine, and the overarching specter of a second Asian land war all affected the formulation and execution of the American-Korean response to North Korea's bold provocations.
Low-intensity conflict remains a serious concern for a U.S. Army oriented on more dangerous, less likely midintensity wars. While the Korean situation of 1966–69 was certainly unique, this analysis of the allied performance in a forgotten conflict offers some important conclusions that may prove valuable to those confronted with the continuing challenges of waging – and winning – America's small wars.
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| KATALÓGUS | TARTALOM |
