GEORGE, Alexander L. : The Chinese Communist Army in action (fülszöveg)
Even today, in this era of advanced nuclear weapons, Mao Tse-tung and the leaders of the Chinese People's Liberation Army argue that the superior morale and military skill of their forces can compensate for inferior weapons. Their argument of "man-over-weapons" is not an empty slogan. Behind it lies a military doctrine and a concept of military organization derived from years of combat experience against better-armed, more modern forces.
What "man-over-weapons" means was demonstrated by the performance of the PLA in Korea. The initial Chinese offensives of the winter of 1950–51 forced the United States Army into the longest retreat in its history. Under the shock of defeat, American soldiers speculated as to what motivated the Chinese soldiers and enabled them to fight so well. In search of a better answer to this question, Alexander L. George conducted interviews with approximately three hundred Chinese prisoners during March, April, and May 1951 as part of a study made by The RAND Corporation for the United States Air Force. From these interviews he has reconstructed in detail the kind of egalitarian ethos, social organization, and morale-building system the Chinese Communists employed ín their forces and the central role assigned to the political apparatus within the army.
Mr. George found that as combat victories became less frequent and defeats more numerous, the morale of the Chinese soldiers wore thin and the organizational checks of the unit political cadres were weakened. The longer the Korean War lasted and the higher PLA casualties mounted, the more difficult it became to make good communists out of conscripts and former Chinese Nationalist elements. Chinese leaders could hardly have anticipated how serious the plight of their armies would be when their spring 1951 offensive came to a close, and they were immediately subjected to a strong counteroffensive by UN forces. Under heavy pressure the ability of PLA cadres to maintain control over their units gave way.
The effect of this picture of disintegrating armies on top Chinese leaders may be surmised. On June 23, 1951 Jacob Malik, Sovíet Ambassador to the United Nations, called with studied casualness for a cease-fire.
The limits to which reliance on "man-over weapons" can be carried were reached and passed in Korea. This experience had a traumatic effect on Chinese military leaders. After the Korean War, they attempted with Soviet assistance to create a more modern professional army. For the first time in its history, the PLA introduced conscription for a fixed term of service, a professional officer corps, and a system of military ranks. But "professionalism" led to serious political difficulties and Chinese leaders decided to restore the kind of revolutionary-egalitarian army they had had earlier. In May 1965 ranks were abolished within the PLA to "further promote the revolutionization of our army."Once again, despite its development of nuclear weapons, the Chinese Communist regime is trying to enhance "politics" and the "human element" in its army, and is emphasizing "man-over-weapons." But it is doubtful that Chinese leaders today are as united and self-confident of their military doctrine and tactics as they were at the time of their intervention in the Korean War. How well the PLA will fight in the future under a variety of different circumstances is a difficult question to answer. But it seems safe to say that against a strong opponent who can bring superior fire-power and mobility to bear, the PLA will do better in relatively small-scale operations in which its leaders can control the time, place, and duration of combat engage ments than in protracted large-scale fighting along fixed lines of battle.
Alexander L. George is a specialist on political-military studies at The RAND Corporation, and was formerly Head of its Social Science Department. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago, and has lectured at the University of Chicago and American University. Formerly a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and currently a visiting professor of political science at Stanford University, Mr. George is the author of Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (with Mrs. George) and of Propaganda Analysis.
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