GUGELER, Russell A. : Combat actions in Korea (előszó)
Foreword to Original Edition
* "The smallest detail, taken from an actual incident in war, is more instructive for me, a soldier, than all the Thiers and Jominis in the world. They speak, no doubt, for the heads of states and armies but they never show me what I wish to know – a battalion, a company, a squad, in action." These are the words of Col. Charles Ardant du Picq (1821–70) in his Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle.
These small-unit actions are written primarily for the junior officers, the noncommissioned officers, and the privates, of the Army of the United States. They are for the many rather than the few. This book is an attempt to put into their hands the experiences of others on the battlefield – the confusion of battle, the importance of discipline, and the necessity for constant, realistic training. It is hoped that, by reading these experiences, those who have not yet been in battle will be neither surprised nor unduly shocked at what they meet. Not that these actions will be duplicated, but those who have read them will have a better idea of what to expect. One gun properly manned, one mine properly placed, one range properly measured, one registration properly executed, one bit of light, one cloud, one piece of ice, one puddle, the dust of a road – all can go to make or break the success of a small engagement and may mean life or death.
Too often the battlefield is one in which the survivor bemoans his lack of foresight together with the loss of his comrades. Too often the working of the fighting team is not thoroughly understood by its members before the battle. Small-unit maneuvers, combat exercises, and battle drill all go to make up the experience necessary to successful combat, but over and above this a knowledge of the experiences of others will add immeasurably to the competence of the individual and of the team when he meets the real thing. Too often in preparation for combat a general statement suffices to cover a necessary detail not even thought of until after the event. The study of these accounts will reveal that it is the all around man rather than the specialist who will be successful on the battlefield when the chips are down, even though the specialist does have a vital part in the operation.
One of the biggest reasons for failure on the field of battle is not knowing what to do next and, in most cases, this is the result of not having been trained thoroughly in what to expect on the battlefield.
It is hoped that a study of the experiences of others laid down in these pages will lessen the surprise of battlefield confusion, will aid in the solution of the problems that arise, and insure that a greater number of the leaders who invariably rise to the need for them will survive to appreciate the results of the victory.
ORLANDO WARD
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Military History,
1949–52
Foreword to Revised Edition
This book was originally published in 1954, the year following the close of the Korean War. The accounts of small-unit actions were written primarily for junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates of the United States Army who had not yet been in battle. The object was to acquaint them with the recent combat experiences of others and thus better prepare them for the realities of their own fields.
Since the Korean War, some of the tools and procedures of battle have changed, but the basic conditions of combat have not. Indeed, the surprises, confusion, and problems faced on one battlefield generally resemble the difficulties met on another. Accounts of battle experience at other times in other places, then, continue to have instructive value. It is with this fact in mind that this book is reprinted.
One of the accounts contained in the original version was omitted after a review of the source material on which it was based revealed several irreconcilable errors. All of the other episodes appear in their original form. Those who absorb the lessons they offer can substantially increase their competence as leaders and members of small units in battle, and all students of military history should find profit in these intimate and objective stories of combat action.
Coauthor of Okinawa: The Last Battle in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Russell A. Gugeler returned to active duty as a combat historian in the Korean War. He subsequently served as historian for the Pacific Theater of Operations and later as historian for Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, retiring as a lieutenant colonel in 1968. He is presently the civilian historian for the United States European Command.Washington, D.C.
30 September 1969
HAL C. PATTISON
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
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