Can we win in Vietnam? (fülszöveg)
Amid repeated claims by Pentagon and Admínistration spokesmen that they are beginning to see "light at the end of the tunnel," critics of the Vietnam war have increasingly begun to assert that the tunnel is turning out to be a "bottomless pit." And as the costs of the war – in human, moral, and political, as well as economic, terms – continue to mount, one question has assumed overriding importance: Can the war, in fact, be won, militarily and/or politically? And what, indeed, do we mean by victory?
There are, of course, no easy answers, but in this timely work Herman Kahn and his colleagues attempt to provide a systematic confrontation and clarification of the issues in volved in the developing great national debate over the future course of the war. The authors, all experienced analysts of political and military affairs, represent different points of view; the principal integrating influence is Herman Kahn, Director of the Hudson Institute and author of the controversial studies On Thermonuclear War and On Escalation. Bringing to bear such new "think tank" techniques as the use of scenario analysis to guide policy-makers, they provide what is, in effect, a full-scale feasibility (and desirability) study of the war – issues, aims, costs, conduct, and prospects.
In the book's first chapter, Mr. Kahn sets the context for debate. He analyzes attitudes toward the war and constructs scenarios in which the outcomes range from complete military victory to outright defeat, including varying levels of negotiated or imposed victories and defeats that lie between. Thus the reader enters the discussion aware of the ramifications of a wide range of policy goals.
The second chapter, written by Raymond D. Gastil, a former research associate at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, examines the social, political, and religious diversities of Vietnam, relating these to the current struggle. Next, Frank E. Armbruster, a specialist in military history and operations analysis, considers the specifics of the war, comparing it with other guerrilla and irregular wars in history.
The thrust of the arguments of Gastil and Armbruster is that we can and should win in Vietnam. Gastil sees victory as the way of stabilizing the nation and aiding the Vietnamese people in their desire to stay free of totalitarian control; and Armbruster believes it essential to stop the Communist inroads, which he views as being dependent on the power of organized terror supported by military force.
The two authors who take up the discussion at this point present radically different viewpoints. First, Edmund Stillman, a former senior research fellow at the Russian Institute of Columbia University, questions both the advisability of attempting to win and our ability to do so, pointing to what he believes are basic misconceptions of American political thought. Then William Pfaff, co-author with Stillman of Power and Impotence and a former editor of Commonweal, accepts and extends Stillman's arguments and tries to indicate ways in which we may reach a settlement that would salvage some important U.S. interests.
In the concluding chapter of the first part of the book, Herman Kahn explores the wide range of possibilities for victory or defeat, detailing the basic factors likely to affect the outcome of the conflict. He then develops, step by step, an "optimistic" scenario which he calls "Initial Success and Eventual Victory."
In Part II, those authors who answer the title question affirmatively present specific war plans by which they believe victory can be achieved. Frank Armbruster offers a police and security plan based on the creation of an everexpanding secure zone of cleared areas behind a protective military belt; and Raymond Gastil sets forth a plan for the deployment of forces in Vietnam that will gradually lead to the clearing and holding of ever larger areas of the country. Herman Kahn concludes this part by weighing and evaluating the Armbruster and Gastil plans, and offering a number of specífic proposals of his own to improve the U.S. and South Vietnamese conduct of the war.
In the final section, a roundtable discussion, the five authors confront each other in a free wheeling debate that takes up the moral, as well as the military and political, issues posed by the struggle in Vietnam – providing a thought-provoking conclusion to an altogether unique and tough-minded report to the people on the most crucial question of our day.
"One of the most substantive books available on Vietnam policy alternatives. And the style is consistently clear and exoteric." – The Kirkus Service
The book may be the freshest one on Vietnam in the last couple of years." – The Wall Street Journal
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