SHARP : Strategy for defeat (fülszöveg)
Was Vietnam, as critics have charged, an inherently immoral and unwinnable war, or a conflict that could have and should have been won? Admiral Sharp reveals the decision-making at the highest levels of government and critically analyzes the strategy as it evolved.
The author writes from a unique ventage point, having served as Commander in Chief Pacific during four of the most critical war years. Though he was in charge of all military activities in the Pacific, including Vietnam, with Generals Westmoreland and Abrams reporting to him, his directives came from Washington. There the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated an aggressive campaign, emphasizing bombing of the heartland of North Vietnam and mining of enemy harbors. The civilian leadership, however, placed severe restrictions on the bombing and insisted on a strategy of gradualism. While the hawks and the doves battled in Washington, the long, exasperating struggle in Vietnam dragged on for a futile decade.
In clear, hard-hitting prose, Sharp describes the frustrations of "fighting a war with one hand tied behind our backs." He details the misuse of air power which resulted from the limitations placed on its employment by political leaders. Once our civilian leadership makes the awesome decision to wage war, Sharp contends, that leadership must permit the war to be engaged expeditiously and full bore, not halfway.
Admiral Sharp quotes from personal interviews, from official dispatches and documents, and from the Pentagon Papers. Based on a firsthand knowledge of the events, strategies, and personalities, his account is a valuable contribution to contemporary history.
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| KATALÓGUS | TARTALOM |
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