VAN DYKE : North Vietnam's strategy for survival (fülszöveg)
Here is the most objective, comprehensive picture and analysis to date of the effects of the war, especially United States bombing raids, on North Vietnam's military strategy and its economic, political, and social life.
From early 1965 to late 1968, U.S. planes dropped an average of 800 tons of bombs, rockets, and missiles on North Vietnam almost every day. The bomb tonnage was twice as much as the U.S. dropped in the Pacific Theater in World War II or in Korea in the Korean War. The daily bombing raids over North Vietnam were halted, but were later resumed on an irregular but not infrequent basis, and continue as this book is published.
Why did the most sophisticated and sustained bombing campaign in history fail to force the North Vietnamese to sue for peace, or at least to abandon or curtail their military offensive in South Vietnam?
The author has used virtually all of the available sources – North Vietnamese publications, both those aimed at its own citizens and those directed at the world at large, reports of newspapermen and others allowed to visit North Vietnam, statements by North Vietnamese leaders, U.S. Department of Defense reports and statements – to put together as clear and as detailed a picture as possible of how North Vietnam has survived and adjusted to the war and the bombing raids.
The war has affected every aspect of North Vietnamese life. The author describes the extent of the destruction in North Vietnam and the attempts of the North Vietnamese to overcome the difficulties caused by the bombing.
Particular emphasis is put on the evacuation of people and industry from the cities to the rural areas, the labor shortages caused by the increase in the size of the army and by the need for man power to repair transportation routes, and the changes which have been necessitated in the country's agricultural and industrial sectors.
The author also analyzes the "long war" strategy of the North Vietnamese, the success of their efforts to maintain their infiltration of men and supplies into the south, and their grumbling gratitude toward military and economic aid from Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the East European countries.
Finally, the author describes the strains that have been placed on the Party apparatus in North Vietnam and the degree of autonomy the central government has been forced to give to local provinces because of the difficulties of communication and transportation during the war.
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| KATALÓGUS | TARTALOM |
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